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MR. KEYTE:  Good morning to part of the 
world; good afternoon to another part of the world, 
including our speakers.   
As everybody may know, in the live 
conference the heads of authority have their own 
workshop and we do not really get a chance to ask 
questions at the Fordham Conference of heads of 
authority unless they are keynote speakers.  What we 
thought we would do this year, with a virtual 
conference, is have a Q&A session with some key heads 
of authority around the world that will primarily be 
for the audience.  In that regard, what we are going 
to do is have fairly rapid opening thoughts; I will 
ask a few questions, and then we will open it up to 
the audience. 
Very quick introductions, and I am doing it 
alphabetically, not necessarily in order.  We have: 
Andrea Coscelli, Chief Executive of the CMA — you 
could wave, but everybody knows who you are; Isabelle 
de Silva, President of the French Authority; Cani 
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Fernández, President of the Spanish Authority; Olivier 
Guersent, Director-General, DG Comp; Margarida Matos 
Rosa, President, Portuguese Authority; Gabriella 
Muscolo, Commissioner of the Italian Authority and a 
longtime friend; and Christine Wilson, Commissioner of 
the FTC, a colleague and sometimes opposing her in 
private practice back in the day. 
The general topics are: antitrust in times 
of pandemic; are the tools for Big Tech right; and 
where does sustainability fit in antitrust?  Certainly 
you all should prepare questions that you may have, 
try to keep them related to those topics. I am sure 
there will be some others, but we will get to choose, 
frankly. 
Why don’t we start off with some quick 
observations or comments from each of our excellent 
panelists?  I don’t know if they have chosen an order, 
or I could choose one for them.  Why don’t we just do 
it alphabetically as well? 
Andrea, why don’t you start? 
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MR. COSCELLI:  Thanks, James. 
Just a couple of thoughts from me on the 
pandemic.  One of the things we did in March, when we 
had the first wave in the United Kingdom, was to 
launch a task force to work across the organization to 
try to react very quickly to events, which we think 
has been a fairly successful model for us.1 
Essentially, our work focused on three areas.   
One was to monitor prices and deal with lots 
of complaints coming in about price increases for 
things like face masks, hand sanitizers, or food 
products.  We wrote lots of letters, we worked a lot 
with trade associations, and opened a number of 
targeted investigations in this area. 
The second area was cooperation among 
businesses.  We published very quickly some guidance 
and then we worked closely with government to pass 
legislation to allow for cooperation in a number of 
key areas, like healthcare, groceries, and dairy.  
Interestingly, some of these had sunset clauses, so 
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some of these agreements had exclusions from this 
agreement that ended in the last few weeks. 
Finally, because we are also a consumer 
protection authority, we have done a lot of work on 
cancellations and refunds — or I should say lack of 
refunds — by a number of businesses.  We have a number 
of ongoing investigations and we have reached 
settlements with a number of businesses to ensure that 
they refunded the many, many consumers who suffered 
during the first wave. 
Unfortunately, it feels like there is the 
beginning of a second wave in a number of places in 
Europe, including the United Kingdom, so we might have 
to go back and do a number of these things again in 
the coming months. 
Thanks.  That is what I want to say by way 
of introduction, James. 
MR. KEYTE:  Isabelle? 
MS. de SILVA:  I want to say that this 
 
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-cma-taskforce/cma-covid-19-taskforce 
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period has been one that has taught us a lot in terms 
of how to organize the workforce.  I think, like for 
many private and public organizations, this was a big 
challenge for us, and it also was very instructive to 
see how we could organize working from home to 
maintain our mission. 
I would say that one of the priorities that 
we had during this period was to maintain a steady 
flow in terms of merger notifications and approvals.  
We tried as much as possible not to delay merger 
examinations and to maintain a rapid flow of 
decisions.  This was quite a challenge for the teams, 
but we maintained a steady flow of decisions. 
In regard to the impact of the Covid-19 
crisis on possible antitrust practices, I think, like 
Andrea described for the CMA, we put in a lot of 
effort in terms of trying to respond to questions from 
the private sectors.  There were not that many 
questions that were asked to the authority, maybe 
because there is not a tradition that we easily answer 
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any questions they may have about “Is that argument 
compatible with antitrust law?” 
We had one in which we gave an answer and we 
publicized it.  The question was whether opticians 
could decide together the way in which they would pay 
their rent during the Covid-19 crisis.   
In terms of antitrust practices, we set up a 
Covid-19 task force to get as much information as 
possible about possible infringements, and we did 
receive quite a lot of information from the market 
about possible abuses. 
We also had one case that we dealt with in a 
very speedy manner because it was in the French 
office, an exclusivity conduct that might have 
prevented some hospitals from receiving the materials 
they needed to deal with Covid-19 patients.  This was 
settled through a discussion with the company, and the 
company was very proactive in terms of ceasing to 
practice this exclusivity, so this was settled in a 
matter of days. 
 8 
 
 
 
 
This was what I wanted to say for my opening 
remarks. 
MR. KEYTE:  Cani? 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Hello to everyone and thank 
you so much.  I am very happy to be here with all of 
you. 
In fact, I would like to transmit three 
ideas in my opening remarks: how we dealt with 
treating the pandemic internally; what we did at the 
national level; and what we were doing at the 
international level? 
Internally, as for everybody, the shock was 
immediate.  From one day to the following we had a 
state of alarm declared, so people had to work from 
home from one day to the following.  It has worked 
remarkably well.  We are still teleworking.  We have 
postponed coming back to work because the situation in 
Madrid and in Barcelona, because we have two 
headquarters, is uncertain.  So we are still 
teleworking with no problem.   
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Everybody, including the board, was meeting 
through teams, and it worked very well.  In areas 
where duty required presence, we were organizing some 
work shifts so that people could telework or work in 
person. 
At the national level, what did we do for 
consumers and users?   
The first thing we did was to organize a 
specific mailbox for complaints regarding any 
antitrust or competition infringement related to 
Covid-19, and there were over 700 complaints that we 
were dealing with in different areas, as you can 
imagine.  Sanitary products was one.  Another one was 
private insurance in order to cover treatment in 
public or private hospitals.  Also we had in the 
funerary sector some cases that were extremely sad. 
One area in which we are still investigating 
is the financial sector, where some of the loans that 
were granted with a guaranty of the state were linked 
to other products like insurance or alarm services or 
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others, and we are still investigating that. 
Apart from that, we were also issuing some 
guidance in cooperation agreements.  We did that in 
several areas as well and it worked well.  All of our 
answers were given in fewer than ten days, and we were 
doing that in accordance with the guidance received 
from the European Commission.  Olivier will be able to 
tell us more about that. 
Internationally, we were cooperating with 
other authorities that were having similar problems to 
ours, and we were trying to exchange views and help 
each other in understanding how to approach issues 
that we were having in a similar way. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you very much. 
Olivier, you happen to also fall 
alphabetically in the right spot, given the reference 
from Cani. 
MR. GUERSENT:  Thank you, James. 
Very quickly, before the Covid-19 crisis, my 
view is that competition policy was already confronted 
 11 
 
 
 
 
with a number of long-term challenges — digitization, 
globalization, and climate change.  At least for the 
European Commission these were the three big ones.  Of 
course, the Covid-19 crisis added a number of short-
term challenges to that, at the same time as it shrank 
the lead time we have to adapt to the longer-term 
challenges as well.  It made everything more pressing. 
We have maybe a specificity in the 
Commission as we have the pleasure to deal with 
antitrust and mergers, as do all of our colleagues, 
and we have the even greater pleasure to deal with 
state aid (state subsidies) and of course when facing 
such a crisis this becomes quite a crucial instrument, 
so it took quite a lot of our time. 
When we moved to an emergency response, we 
had all of the organizational challenges that Cani 
just referred to — and that all of us had to face, 
like many, many other organizations and companies.   
The first thing to do, was the emergency 
response.  In state aid that meant authorizing quite 
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large amounts of money to be put into the economy in 
Europe while trying to preserve the integrity of the 
single market. This is because, of course the fiscal 
capacity of the various Member States is quite 
different and the potential for fragmentation of 
diverging responses is therefore quite big. 
In antitrust — I think Andrea referred to it 
— we have authorized quite unusual cooperation we 
would probably never have authorized in normal times.  
I signed the first comfort letter for the last sixteen 
years I think in the European Commission, to allow the 
European manufacturers of generic medicines for 
intensive care units to step up their production in 
order to increase their output, which is a typical 
allocation of production behavior that we would 
normally prohibit.  In that case we actually helped 
organize it so as not to create permanent damage, in 
the sense that we organized it in a way that the 
various participants didn’t have access to each 
other’s data. 
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I think the next challenge will be: How do 
we move from emergency response to accompanying the 
recovery while keeping in mind the longer-term 
challenges that I alluded to at the beginning.  For us 
at least, that will be the next challenge and that 
will require a careful calibration of competition 
policy. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you, Olivier. 
Margarida? 
MS. MATOS ROSA:  Hello to everyone joining 
us today and to my fellow panel members, and, James, 
hello to you as well. 
Given what has been said so far, I think I 
might as well share some of what has been keeping us 
busy in terms of current times but also in the short 
and medium run.   
I would like to say we see these times as 
important times and an opportunity to put our best 
efforts into seeing antitrust policy embedded in other 
policies. 
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We know that policymakers have been 
extremely busy focusing on health issues, on the 
economy, on social and labor policies, and rightly so, 
but without competition policy underlying other 
policies, that focus can have a cost and that cost may 
slow down progress in those same policies.  We see 
this as a risk that can be materialized if we relax 
competition rules.   
If you shield markets from competitive 
pressure and if you relax current rules to a big 
extent, then you may end up with less innovation, with 
higher prices, with less consumption, and therefore 
with slower economic growth.  We as a society all have 
an interest in ensuring that competition policy 
becomes one of the pillars of the economic recovery in 
the short and in the medium run. 
For this to occur, I think we all — as an 
antitrust community of enforcers but also of lawyers 
and academia — must reach out beyond our comfort zone, 
beyond our inner circle — present here today I have no 
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doubt — and we must be more eloquent about the 
positive role of competition policy.  I will leave it 
here for now. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you, Margarida. 
Gabriella? 
MS. MUSCOLO:  Thank you, James. 
Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, 
everybody.  I am delighted to take part in this 
meeting again, although I would have liked more to be 
with you in person in New York. 
We are all living in a time of profound 
disruption which will impact our countries 
economically and socially.   
First of all, the impact of the Covid-19 
outbreak on sustainable development and competition 
puts national competition authorities in a situation 
where they must rethink the consumer welfare standard 
by taking into account new elements not necessarilyy 
with regard to prices and quantities, such as quality 
and innovation perhaps. 
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Second, these changes should find a 
practical application into the legal tools at our 
disposal. 
Third, we should start by putting more 
emphasis on tools capable of entitling decision 
makers, such as the national competition authorities, 
to interact with policymakers in a procompetitive 
manner.   
Advocacy represents a flexible instrument to 
deal with new truths.  Through this tool, the Italian 
Competition Authority interacts with policymakers and, 
by applying the principle of proportionality, the 
Authority is able to strike a balance between 
competition and other policy goals and to soften the 
actual conflict between antitrust policies and 
industrial policies. 
In more detail, how has the Covid-19 
outbreak changed our way of operating?  The Italian 
Competition Authority has decided not to create a 
specific task force to cope with the emergency 
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situation.  Indeed, the Authority’s decision has been 
that each division will continue its enforcement 
activity related to other issues.  However, the 
interaction between the Consumer Protection Division 
and the Antitrust Division has intensified, and the 
Authority has decided to review its priorities 
regarding intervention in light of the extraordinary 
situation. 
Moreover, in order to face possible 
essential products shortages during the Covid-19 
outbreak, the Italian Competition Authority published 
a Communication on Cooperation Agreements in the 
Covid-19 Emergency, which was in line with the one 
published by the European Commission in April 2020. 
I will stop here.  Thank you for your 
attention. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
We will go to Christine, who for her entire 
life has dreaded the phrase “let’s go in alphabetical 
order.” 
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MS. WILSON:  Only since I got married, 
James.  I was Christine Bravery before I got married, 
so I was slightly further up in the alphabet. 
In any event, it is a pleasure to be here. 
Fordham always hosts a wonderful event, and I am sorry 
that we cannot be together in person, but it is 
delightful to be here on this panel with some of my 
favorite colleagues. 
I am going to talk about one of the other 
topics that James has chosen for today’s panel.  I 
would like to share some breaking news. The House of 
Representatives in the United States Congress has been 
conducting an investigation into the tech arena for 
the last year and a half, and they finally issued 
their long-awaited report. Last night it landed.   
To be precise, this is a report of the 
Antitrust Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of 
the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress.  
They had conducted a series of hearings examining 
online platforms and market power, and last night the 
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report when it was issued totaled 449 pages with 2540 
footnotes.  I have read a chunk of it, focusing on the 
Executive Summary and on the Recommendations.  I am 
still making my way through the rest of it. I am sure 
we will have an opportunity to talk a bit more about 
it, but I have some cause for concern regarding some 
of the recommendations and look forward to talking 
about that. 
I want to emphasize for our international 
audience that this report does not mean that the 
antitrust laws in the United States are changing 
today.  This is a report from the majority of a 
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in the House 
of Representatives in the United States Congress.  
They have signaled that they are thinking about 
introducing legislation in the coming months, but 
until new laws are passed the laws will remain the 
same. 
While the House Judiciary Committee was 
working on this report, the Federal Trade Commission 
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and the Department of Justice and the state attorneys 
general in the United States have also been incredibly 
busy on this front.  I want to just highlight some of 
the activities of the Federal Trade Commission. 
As many of you know, we held hearings in 
2018 and 2019 to examine whether new technologies and 
evolving business practices might require adjustments 
to competition law and policy.  We created the 
Technology Enforcement Division within the Bureau of 
Competition to address markets in which digital 
technology is an important dimension of competition. 
It has been widely reported that both DOJ 
and the FTC have ongoing investigations of digital 
platform companies, and it has been publicly announced 
that we are conducting what is called a 6(b) study, a 
market study, on acquisitions that have been made by 
Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft that 
did not meet the requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
filing regime and so were not prenotified to the FTC 
and DOJ, and this study will help us determine whether 
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there are potentially anticompetitive acquisitions of 
nascent or potential competitors that are flying under 
our radar. 
Obviously, as all of my colleagues 
discussed, tech is getting a lot of headlines, but 
healthcare matters are of significant focus during the 
pandemic, and I am sure we will be talking more about 
that as well. 
Before I wrap up, let me just say with 
respect to the current time in which we are operating 
that my colleagues at the FTC and I moved to telework 
in March.  We are still essentially 100 percent on 
telework, and I am blown away every day by the 
commitment and professionalism and dedication of the 
FTC staff who continue under suboptimal circumstances 
to do incredibly excellent work and it is my privilege 
to work with them. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you, Christine. 
I will ask a few questions to start.  I will 
ask everybody who has a view to give me very short 
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answers, which may be difficult, and then we will have 
some time for some other questions from the audience 
at the end. 
Let me stay with tech first.  Let me ask if 
anybody has a strong view on whether the challenges of 
Big Tech multisided platforms should be one for the 
courts in an iterative process or should it be one for 
legislation?  Have at it. 
Olivier? 
MR. GUERSENT:  I would say both from a 
European perspective.   
What have we seen in the recent past?  We 
have seen that these markets are tipping markets with 
very powerful network effects.  At the same time, they 
are very complex markets for which you need to crunch 
incredible amounts of data to simply establish the 
facts and prove the case.  Of course, rights of 
defense and processual rights are rightly there to 
protect everybody, but all this takes time.  The 
problem we have is that there is a discrepancy between 
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the speed of the investigation and the speed at which 
undesirable effects spread in the market, and 
sometimes you are able to prove your case so late that 
the effects are irremediable. 
I think, on the one hand, you could 
legislate because there are a number of behaviors 
that, at least in Europe, have been proven harmful 
repeatedly when put into effect by very large 
platforms.  You could say, “Well, listen guys, if you 
are in that box and if you are doing one of these 
behaviors, it is prohibited, or it is prohibited 
unless you can prove it is beneficial,” for example.  
That, I think, would require, at least in Europe, 
legislation.  We cannot do it with existing antitrust 
tools. 
But of course, for the traditional Article 
101 and 102 antitrust cases, the courts will continue 
to have a very, very strong role to play because we 
will continue to enforce Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty very forcefully in the future as well.  
 24 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, the courts will also have a role to play, in 
the frame of the new instruments I just referred to, 
if we ever forge them. 
So both really. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
Any other strong and short views, Andrea? 
MR. COSCELLI:  Yes.  I agree with Olivier.  
I think if you look at the financial market, to me it 
is a relevant comparison, where you have quite a lot 
of extra regulation in place because of the 
persistence of some of the behaviors that worried us 
over the last ten or fifteen years, but you still have 
strong antitrust enforcement in some areas.  So, the 
courts will always play a role certainly in antitrust 
and certainly on any sort of regulatory framework that 
is added to it. 
I think there is an issue of speed.  There 
is an issue also of case law in antitrust, which 
obviously is interpreted as the way that they test 
your view and the burden of proof on agencies, which 
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is linked to a number of historic tech cases, so there 
is very strong documentary evidence, very strong 
evidence of historical behavior.  I think the issue 
with a number of these tech cases is their fast-moving 
nature, their complexity, and the fact that the 
evidence keeps moving in a way, so you are trying to 
deal with a moving target. 
We are very much in the same place.  We are 
advising the government in the United Kingdom that we 
need more regulation alongside our existing work using 
our current toolkit. 
MS. WILSON:  James, if I can hop in for a 
minute. 
MR. KEYTE:  Yes, sure. 
MS. WILSON:  Obviously, Big Tech is a 
significant focus of concern — and we are not just 
talking about antitrust concerns; people have concerns 
about privacy and about data security and they have 
concerns in the United States about Section 230 and 
content moderation and harmful content posted online, 
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in addition to the competition concerns that we have.  
So when you ask, “Is regulation appropriate or do we 
leave this to the courts?,” I would say in some areas 
I do believe that new laws would be helpful. 
The Federal Trade Commission, on a 
bipartisan basis for probably fifteen or twenty years 
now, has asked the Congress in the United States to 
pass comprehensive federal privacy legislation and 
data security legislation.  I think that if there had 
been limits on the kinds of information that could be 
collected and how that information could be shared and 
used and monetized, we may see a different competitive 
landscape.   
I have taken again this opportunity to 
encourage Congress to pass federal privacy 
legislation.  It would be great to see data security 
legislation, and it would be great for the United 
States to figure out how it wants to deal with 
revisions to Section 230. 
That said, I believe that on the competition 
 27 
 
 
 
 
front the tools that we have and the case law that we 
have are fit for the purpose.  I do not believe that 
we need new laws in the antitrust arena — and perhaps 
we will talk a bit more about that — but my view now 
is that case law, for the most part, is headed in the 
right direction and giving us the answers we need that 
will maximize consumer welfare. 
MR. KEYTE:  Great. 
I am going to direct the next question to 
those who have not taken on a question yet, and focus 
on abusive pricing — something that, of course, in the 
United States some would say is not encompassed by the 
laws there, and I know there are difficult standards 
to meet in the Member States in the European Union — 
and then you put on top of that the pandemic. 
Addressing the rest of the panel, how do you 
deal with abusive pricing in a time of pandemic, where 
even some of the pricing may not be viewed as being by 
dominant firms may still be viewed as abusive in a 
sense?  Have you had to make any adjustments in those 
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standards or how you review that? And then maybe, 
Christine, you could comment at the end about whether 
it has had any impact on the thinking in the United 
States, given the law. 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Let me start because we did 
have some situations in Spain in which we were 
confronted during the pandemic with several episodes 
of excessive pricing and our Ministry of Consumer 
Protection had to react.  They were imposing some caps 
for certain products, in particular health masks and 
hydro-alcoholic gels. 
We were being consulted.  We were providing 
some guidance.  We were taking care that it was a very 
short measure, that it was proportionate, that it was 
really just to stop a particular situation, but I 
believe that, with the exception of these very 
specific elements of crisis or procedures of crisis, 
we should be vigilant more in trying to avoid barriers 
to entry than fixing prices themselves.  If needed, 
you can go, but it has to be short and proportionate 
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in my view, and of course for reasons of general 
interest. 
MR. KEYTE:  Isabelle or Margarida? 
MS. de SILVA:  Yes, thank you, James. 
The question of price is quite interesting 
when you look at the choices that were made by France.  
In France one of the reactions to the pandemic was to 
adopt a great number of specific laws and decrees 
regarding this sanitary crisis, and the choice was 
made to put a general cap on prices of hydro-alcoholic 
solution and protective equipment.  This had the 
effect that all vendors decided to apply the maximum 
price set by the government, but the government 
decided when the emergency period came to an end this 
summer in France to do away with those price caps. 
We had two months of practical unique prices 
in France and now we are again with prices that 
compete against each other.  I think that for the 
economic analysis it would be quite interesting to see 
a real effect of price cap on the market and the pros 
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and cons.   
This means that we did not have that much 
action in terms of abusive prices, so this was more 
dealt with by the agency in charge of protecting the 
consumer against fraud or products that were sold with 
abusive prices regarding consumer protection.  In our 
agency so far we did not have that much demand in that 
respect. 
MR. KEYTE:  I am going to move on to another 
topic. I think Gabriella and Margarida may have been 
ready for this, but there are some interesting 
questions coming in. 
One question that is a combination of what 
is coming in and some thoughts I have had for 
Gabriella, given your background in intellectual 
property as a judge for so long, is: How do you give 
good ex ante advice, advice in advance, for businesses 
that are in the platform space and have intellectual 
property rights?  How do they get guided by the 
agencies when in fact they often do not know what is 
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going to be challenged or scrutinized until much 
later, after the behavior has been in the marketplace? 
MS. MUSCOLO:  Thank you, James, for your 
question.  It a very tricky one. 
The Italian Competition Authority advocates 
for competition, but advocacy is directed to public 
administration and not to stakeholders.  Furthermore, 
we have not had advocacy cases until now on dealing 
with the interplay between IP and competition. 
MR. KEYTE:  Margarida? 
MS. MATOS ROSA:  Let me say I agree with 
what Christine was saying before, in the sense that 
there is a lot of legislation around consumer 
protection that still needs to be fully implemented 
and used before we quickly jump to the conclusion that 
we need to change our legislation in terms of 
competition policy. 
Competition policy amendments may also be 
required, but I believe that consumer protection has a 
lot of laws on privacy, especially in Europe, that can 
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be fully used to the benefit of consumers. 
This leads me to say that we are not in the 
consumer protection business as an agency, but we do 
several things.  We can provide guidance to individual 
companies that request our guidance if they are in 
difficulties in assessing what they should do — of 
course, not always; more in the pandemic period than, 
generally speaking, in other periods of time. 
But when we did our assessments in a sector 
inquiry on e-commerce, on the use of algorithms, on 
basically the different business models that are used 
by platforms, we did come up with one conclusion and 
one recommendation to companies, which was that 
companies are responsible for the algorithms they use.2  
Of course, this only responds to the collusion side, 
not to the other sides of the discussion, but at least 
we came up with that conclusion and that 
recommendation, that companies are responsible for the 
 
2 See AdC’s Issues Paper on “Digital ecosystems, Big Data and Algorithms” (2019) available at 
http://www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Estudos_e_Publicacoes/Estudos_Economicos/Outros/Documents
/Digital%20Ecosystems,%20Big%20Data%20and%20Algorithms%20-%20Issues%20Paper.pdf. 
Executive summary available at 
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algorithms they choose and for the outcomes that these 
algorithms may grant them. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
We just have a few minutes left.  What I 
would like everybody to comment on very quickly, if 
you have a view, is whether in the age of Big Tech and 
digital economies around the world, do you think the 
consumer welfare standard needs to change, needs to 
evolve, or is it still just fine? 
Why don’t we go in reverse-alphabetical 
order, if that’s okay, starting with Christine. 
MS. WILSON:  Absolutely. 
I do have a view.  I believe that the 
consumer welfare standard, which is currently the 
touchstone of antitrust enforcement in the United 
States and in many other jurisdictions, is incredibly 
flexible.  We take into account price and cost and 
choice and quality and output and innovation.  In 
fact, between 2004 and 2014 more than 160 cases were 
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challenged by the Federal Trade Commission, and in 
almost half of them we had a claim regarding 
suppression or diminution of innovation. 
There are those who say that the consumer 
welfare standard is only about short-run price and 
output, and I would ask them to look at the kinds of 
cases that the agencies have been bringing for a very 
long time, and I would submit to you that in fact 
innovation is a significant part of what we do.  
Though I believe here in the United States 
we have the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which 
have broad flexible standards, their application is 
informed by the consumer welfare standard, which 
focuses on the benefits of consumers without diluting 
by focusing on other goals, including sustainability, 
except as a nonprice aspect of competition — 
sustainability could be one; privacy could be one.  I 
would submit to you that that is what is going to 
deliver the greatest benefits to consumers in both the 
short and long runs. 
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MR. KEYTE:  Given our time, I will probably 
ask everybody to say, first, do you agree with 
everything Christine says, which I think it was very 
well said, and then we can get your very quick views, 
starting, going in reverse order, with Gabriella. 
MS. MUSCOLO:  Thank you, James. 
Before the Covid-19 outbreak, there was 
already an ongoing debate on competition, 
sustainability, and consumer welfare.  Covid-19 has 
only enhanced the debate in relation to the healthcare 
sector, in my opinion without adding anything new to 
the theoretical framework. 
Indeed, do you remember, James, last year 
during the Fordham Antitrust Workshop with Scott 
Hemphill and Tim Wu we were discussing whether the 
consumer welfare standard approach could be considered 
a significant step forward for antitrust policies?  I 
have already mentioned the changes in the consumer 
welfare notion in my opening statement. 
Let me close on a last point.  In this 
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context, I believe that we should take into account 
how competition law reacted after the 2007–2008 
financial crisis.  Competition should not be 
restricted in the name of other public interests — 
such as financial stability, for instance — because in 
the medium to long term it could harm consumers even 
more. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
Margarida? 
MS. MATOS ROSA:  I believe the scope of 
competition analysis can be kept pretty much the same.  
This, of course, does not mean that we cannot add 
other perspectives into areas — such as State Aid, for 
example, if we want to talk about sustainability, 
which is one of the big topics right now — but, in 
general, the interplay with other policies can be 
taken into account but mildly and only in some 
particular aspects of competition enforcement.  In 
general, I would keep pretty much the scope that we 
have and leave other aspects to other decision makers. 
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MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
Olivier? 
MR. GUERSENT:  I can be quick because I 
fully agree with everything Christine said, with just 
one clarification.   
At the end of the day, it all depends on two 
things.  First, how narrowly do you define consumer 
welfare — and I fully agree on price, non-price, 
innovation, and all this.  The second thing is, do you 
need the same constituency of consumers that suffer a 
price increase or other reduction of welfare also to 
be the one that benefits?  I think these are the two 
defining questions.   
Otherwise consumer welfare can accommodate, 
for example, externalities like decarbonization of the 
economy, etc., very well I think. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
Isabelle? 
MS. de SILVA:  Thank you. 
I do fully agree with what Christine, 
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Olivier, and my other colleagues have said.   
Three years ago there was a debate about 
whether the innovation theory that the Commission had 
taken into account in Dow/Du Pont and Bio/Monsanto was 
something that was completely new or was it something 
that had always been there in terms of what type of 
criteria you look at when you do a merger analysis. I 
completely agree with what Christine has said, that 
innovation and quality are really at the heart of what 
we look at in an antitrust analysis. 
I think today the debate is more focused for 
enforcers about new tools, new ways to approach merger 
or antitrust analysis, and I would like to give some 
example if we have time.   
I think the debate in Europe about the 
Digital Services Act and the New Competition Tool 
shows that we are looking at additional tools to those 
we already have to deal with digital platforms or to 
deal with other types of competitive issues.  So the 
debate is really about something additional to merger 
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approval or infringement procedures, and that is 
really interesting. 
Also, when we look at mergers, the recent 
announcement by the Commission and Margrethe Vestager 
that she was willing to consider having a new look at 
mergers that were below the mandatory threshold 
through a referral system to the Commission by 
national competition agencies is a very good example 
of looking at how the procedures can catch all the 
competitive issues or cases we want to look at and we 
do not need to change the criteria or the general 
analytical framework.  This is what I believe in.   
The debate is more about speed, 
effectiveness, and covering all the different issues 
we want to cover. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you. 
Cani? 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  I will be brief.  To answer 
the question shortly, yes, I do believe that the 
consumer welfare standard is the one that we have to 
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move forward.   
But there are many other areas in which 
regulation is coming in order to try to fill some gaps 
that we believe we have, and sometimes these may have 
a problem of collusion in itself, colliding with other 
objectives.  I will use an example that is in my view 
quite worrisome. 
We all believe that privacy is something 
that in order to protect the consumer it has to be 
there, and in Europe and elsewhere nowadays we are 
very vigilant in trying to keep privacy and regulation 
in order to protect privacy.  But now it seems that 
some big players or some dominant players are using 
this regulation as a strategic barrier to entry in 
order not to share data, which is a clear competitive 
parameter nowadays.   
My only warning is, yes, let’s go for 
regulation whenever it’s needed, let’s go to protect 
consumers, but never forget that consumer welfare is 
always at the end of the day the driver for 
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competition always.  So be very vigilant in not over-
regulating with the progress that we may face. 
MR. KEYTE:  Very well said. 
Andrea, the last word. 
MR. COSCELLI:  I will disagree a bit.  I 
will make two points. 
On the first one, in terms of whether 
consumer welfare is wide enough, I am reasonably 
comfortable that for us as an agency we are 
interpreting it in the right way.  But most of our 
relevant decisions go through litigation and through 
the courts, so the question of whether the courts 
interpret consumer welfare in a sufficiently wide 
manner is a very relevant one for me. 
I think you picked the three right topics in 
terms of challenges today for competition authorities 
worldwide:  Obviously Big Tech, the fact that a number 
of people think we have been slow to act in that 
space; obviously the very significant dislocation of 
our economies and what is going to happen post-Covid-
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19; and sustainability.  I think personally the jury 
is very much out whether over the next few years in 
these three areas the majority of voters in each of 
our countries will regard the competition authorities 
being on the right side of the arguments.   
If you take a slightly historical 
perspective, the mandate and the importance of 
competition authorities has gone up and down over the 
years and the decades.  Personally, I think we cannot 
really be complacent. 
This debate about consumer welfare for me is 
very much about whether we are relevant, whether we 
will remain relevant, and whether among various policy 
instruments that are available through our 
parliaments, antitrust and competition policy remain 
one of the key ones. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you so much, and thank you 
to the panel.   
Next year, hopefully when we see each other 
live, we will be able to have some version of this 
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format because I think it is very, very informative, 
we get a lot of perspectives.  But we shall see. 
Again, thank you all very much. 
 
